Relations as Plural-Predications in Plato by Scaltsas, Theodore
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Relations as Plural-Predications in Plato
Citation for published version:
Scaltsas, T 2013, 'Relations as Plural-Predications in Plato' Studia Neoaristotelica, vol 10 , no. 1, pp. 28-49.,
10.5840/studneoar20131013
Digital Object Identifier (DOI):
10.5840/studneoar20131013
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Preprint (usually an early version)
Published In:
Studia Neoaristotelica
Publisher Rights Statement:
© Scaltsas, T. (2013). Relations as Plural-Predications in Plato. Studia Neoaristotelica, 10 (1), 28-49.
10.5840/studneoar20131013
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 20. Feb. 2015
 Relations as Plural-Predications in Plato
1 
Theodore Scaltsas 
Philosophy 
University of Edinburgh 
Abstract 
Plato was the first philosopher to discover the metaphysical phenomenon of plural-
subjects and plural-predication; e.g. you and I are two, but neither you, nor I are two.  I 
argue that Plato devised an ontology for plural-predication through his Theory of Forms, 
namely, plural-partaking in a Form.   Furthermore, I argue that Plato used plural-
partaking to offer an ontology of related individuals without reifying relations.  My 
contention is that Plato’s theory of plural-relatives has evaded detection in the 
exegetical literature because his account of plural-subjects through the Theory of Forms 
had not been recognised for what it is.  I further submit that Plato’s handling of related 
individuals through plural-predication is not only a ‘first’ in philosophy, but also an 
‘only’, having remained a unique account in the metaphysics of relations.  I hope that 
Plato’s account will introduce a fresh approach to contemporary debates on  
the subject.
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 Part of the work for this paper took place at the Bellagio Study Center, Rockefeller Foundation, supported by a 
grant from the Carnegie Trust for the Universities of Scotland; I am thankful to the Foundations for their support.  
I would like to also thank the organisers and the participants of the ‘Semantics and Philosophy in Europe 5’ 
Conference for their useful discussion on an earlier version of the paper presented at the conference.   
2
 I am grateful to Oystein Linnebo for pointing out possible connections of this account to concerns about 
asymmetric relations discussed by Kit Fine, Tim Williamson, and Cian Dorr. I note here, but will not explore the 
possible relevance to the following works:  Williamson, Timothy (1985), ‘Converse Relations’, The Philosophical 
Review, 94: 249–262; Fine, Kit (2000), ‘Neutral Relations’, The Philosophical Review, 109: 1–33; Cian Dorr, 
‘Non-symmetric relations’, Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, 1:155-92 (2004).   
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Introduction 
Plato’s core metaphysical intuition is that transcendent properties – the Forms – are 
responsible for things being qualified in the way they are.  These transcendent properties 
are universal in the sense that many individuals ‘partake’ in each of the transcendent 
properties, at a time. Partaking in any one Form qualifies the partaking individual with 
the property that Form is; thus, an individual is courageous by partaking in the Form of 
Courage.  The intuition is that the property of courageousness comes to be present in the 
individual by partaking in the Form (however ‘partaking’ is interpreted ontologically).  
Since each Form stands for a single property (it is monoeidic), partaking in a From 
qualifies the individual with that property.   
An ontological theory needs to account for, not only qualified individuals, but also for 
related individuals.  Related individuals have been a thorny issue for Plato’s Theory of 
Forms, because the theory does not prima facie seem to be designed to offer an ontology 
of related individuals, since it, strikingly, does not contain any relational Forms. 
Nevertheless, Plato was aware of the need for an explanation, and so did attempt to 
account for related individuals through his Theory of Forms.  What I aim to show in the 
present paper is that, in fact, his account of related individuals is a unique and 
philosophically deeply insightful account, despite the fact that it has evaded recognition 
the history of metaphysics.   
Plato’s solution could not have been the introduction of relational Forms in his 
ontology. This is because partaking in a Form qualifies an individual only with the 
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property the Form stands for.  But asymmetric relations, such as the mother-daughter 
relation, involve the qualification of two (or more) individuals with different properties 
each.  There could be no Form partaking in which would qualify different individuals 
with different properties, e.g. no ‘maternal relational’ Form, such that if two individuals 
partook of it, one individual would be qualified as mother, and the other as offspring.   
I will argue that Plato solves the problem of related individuals in his Theory of Forms 
by using his theory of plural-partaking in Forms, which he developed in one of his early 
dialogues, the Hippias Major.  On his account of plural-predication, two or more 
individuals can partake in a Form as plural-subjects, and come to be jointly qualified by 
a single instance of the property of the Form; e.g. Michael and George, acting jointly, 
are courageous.  Remarkably Plato was insightful enough to see and show in his theory 
that this does not make Michael courageous, or George courageous, but only both of 
them together courageous. Plato will exploit plural-partaking to explain how related 
objects acquire their relational qualifications, rather than introduce relations as 
additional entities between individuals.  The related individuals share a monadic 
property instance in symmetric cases, or a pair of property instances in asymmetric 
cases.  Neither the shared property nor the shared pair of properties are relational 
bridges between the plural-subjects, but a qualification of the subjects like any monadic 
qualification of an object.  The subjects are conjoined in sharing this instance of a 
property, which is attained by the joint-partaking in the Form (dictated by the 
relativising context, as in being equal to, or greater than, etc.).  The joint partaking does 
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not turn the subjects into one, but retains the plurality of the subjects. Rather than 
requiring the oneness of the subjects, plural-partaking furnishes the sharing of the 
instance of the property between the subjects, which perform jointly the metaphysical 
function of partaking.  We shall first turn to Plato’s theory of plural subjects and plural-
partaking in Forms, and then come to examine (symmetrically and asymmetrically) 
related individuals through plural-partaking.   
 
Plural Subjects and Plural-partaking in Platonic Forms 
In Plato’s dialogue Hippias Major, the sophist Hippias, in his exchange with Socrates, 
claims there is no plural predication: 
‘Never shall you find what is attributed to neither me nor you, but is attributed to 
both of us.  If both of us were just, wouldn't each of us be too?  Or if each of us 
were unjust, wouldn't both of us? Or if we were healthy, wouldn't each be? …   
You Socrates think there's some attribute or being that is true of these both but 
not of each, or of each but not of both.  And how could that be, Socrates?  That 
when neither has an attribute, whatever it may be, this attribute – which belongs 
to neither – could belong to both?  …   
…whatever both are, each is as well; and whatever each is, both are.’ (Hippias 
Major 300d7-301e5)   
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I take Hippias’ position to be that the many are f if and only if each of the many is f.  I 
take this position to be the rejection of plural-predication, in the way that such 
predication is described by Hippias and ascribed to Socrates by him.  For Hippias there 
is no shared attribute between the many over and above the individual possessions of 
attributes by each of the many; their collective qualification reduces to individual 
qualifications; I shall call this distributive-predication. Things are qualified in a 
particular way if they are each so qualified, and vice versa.   
Socrates agrees that there are cases like the ones that Hippias mentions.  But 
additionally, Socrates puts forward counterexamples to Hippias’ theory and proposes an 
account that offers the ontology required for his counterexamples.  The difference 
between the accounts is that Socrates does not reduce, in all cases, the collective 
qualification of the many to their individual possessions of that attribute, as Hippias 
does.  Socrates allows for two further types of qualification.  For him, an attribute can 
belong to all the many for independent reasons than it belongs to each of the many, or it 
may even not belong to each of the many at all; the instance of the attribute which is 
shared by the many is different from any instance that may belong to each of the many.  
So there are three types of predication: one distributive (Hippias’), and two plural ones 
(Socrates’). The distributive one is when the many are collectively qualified simply 
because each of the many possesses that attribute; the plural ones are, first, when an 
attribute is shared by all the many in addition to each of the many possessing that 
attribute; and second, when an attribute is shared by all the many while none of the 
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many possesses that attribute. But for simplicity’s sake I will divide them into two only 
camps, one where the many are qualified and each of the many is also qualified, and one 
where the many are qualified but each of the many is not (or vice versa).  (So I will not 
systematically distinguish between the many being qualified because each is qualified, 
and the many being qualified because they share an instance of the attribute over and 
above each possessing that attribute.  The Platonic text also sets up the debate as a 
dichotomy rather than a trichotomy, for starkness of opposition between the two 
theories.) So Hippias and Socrates agree that when each of the many is f, then all are f, 
too; they disagree on whether the many can be f when none of the many is f.   
Socrates’ counterexamples show definitively that there are cases which cannot be 
explained by Hippias’ theory of distributed predication.  He argues as follows (with a 
touch of Socratic irony):  
SOCRATES: ‘We were so foolish, my friend, before you [Hippias] said what you 
did, that we had an opinion about me and you that each of us is one, but that we 
would not both be one (which is what each of us would be) because we are not 
one but two. But now, we have been instructed by you that if two is what we both 
are, two is what each of us must be as well; and if each is one, then both must be 
one as well.  … 
Then it's not entirely necessary, as you [Hipppias] said it was a moment ago, that 
whatever is true of both is also true of each, and that whatever is true of each is 
also true of both.’  (Hipp. Maj. 301d5-302b3)   
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This example makes it clear that Hippias does not have the distributive way out here.  
Even if we could say that David and Susan are one (not ‘two’), it would not be true to 
conclude from this that David is one and Susan is one in the same sense of ‘one’ as each 
is one.  The predicate ‘one’ in these statements means something different; in the former 
it may mean something like ‘inseparable between them’, while in the latter it would 
mean ‘one human being’.  Neither is the predication ‘they are two’ distributive; David is 
not two, nor is Susan, despite the fact that they are two.   
Socrates’ initial counterexample to Hippias’ assumption about distributive predication, 
namely the example of ‘being two persons’, is the simplest to examine.  Each of 
Socrates and Hippias is a human being, while they are two human beings.  The attribute 
of being ‘two’ belongs to them, but not to each of them; it is instantiated only in 
Socrates and Hippias together.  It is the context that makes them two, the context of 
considering Hippias and Socrates and no other.  In this context they, no more and no 
fewer, are two.   
The Metaphysics of the Socratic Position   
Socrates’ metaphysical account of plural predication is explicit.  In plural-predication 
the predicated attribute belongs to all the subjects together; this belonging is not 
reducible to, nor does it need to be grounded on that very attribute belonging to the each 
of the individual subjects; Plato says: ‘when each of them is inexpressible, both together 
may be expressible, or possibly inexpressible’ (Hipp. Maj. 303b7-c1).  If they are 
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expressible together, this is not grounded on individual expressibility if each of them is 
inexpressible.  Let us further consider two colours; each is attractive, and both together 
unattractive.  Hippias could hold that we are justified in saying that the colours are 
attractive (in a distributive sense), since each is attractive.  But it is also true that 
juxtaposed together, the colours are unattractive.  The attribute of being unattractive 
belongs to them together, but does not belong to each individually, contra Hippias.  This 
is what is distinctive of the Socratic position: his metaphysics allows that several 
individuals together can be the subjects of a single instance of an attribute 
(‘unattractive’), which may not be instantiated in each individual; and an attribute 
instantiated in each individual (‘attractive’) may not be instantiated jointly in all of them 
together (although it can be collectively attributed to them in a distributive (Hippian) 
way).  A plural instantiation can coexist, as a different instantiation of an attribute, with 
instances of the same attribute in each of the subjects, as when each colour is attractive, 
but also, they are all attractive, too; or, it can coexist with its opposite, as when the 
colours are unattractive together, despite each of them being attractive; in such a case, 
each colour possesses an attribute (attractiveness) which they do not possess together, 
and they possess an attribute together (unattractiveness) which neither of them possesses 
by itself.   
This ontological independence of plural-predication from individual-predication is just 
what Hippias denied when he said: ‘how could that be, Socrates?  That any state of 
being, whatever, could be attributed to neither, since that attribute, which is attributed to 
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neither, is attributed to both?’ (300b6-8).  Socrates does have an answer; he says that ‘it 
was by the being that adheres to both, if both are [f] …– it was by that they had to be [f] 
…, and not by what falls off one or the other’ (302c4-7, my emphasis).  This attribute 
does not make each of them f: if ‘that attribute adheres in both, but not in each … then 
that’s not what makes each of them [f] …; it doesn’t adhere in each’ (302e5-10).   
How does a colour’s possession of attractiveness, which it possesses together with 
another colour, differ from the colour’s possession of attractiveness all by itself?  The 
metaphysical innovation of Socrates is that a single instance of an attribute can be 
shared by a number of subjects; the instance is literally shared between the subjects; 
they co-possess it; they co-own that instance of the attribute.  I do not use the terms 
‘part-own’, or ‘part-possess’, as they may mislead by suggesting that there are parts of 
the attribute, each of which is fully possessed by each of the subjects respectively.
3
  A 
plurally shared attribute belongs to each individual subject differently than the way that 
that attribute would belong to any one of these subjects if fully possessed by that subject 
alone.  Shared ownership involves only all the sharing-subjects together possessing the 
attribute.  It is like a statue being supported by two pillars.  The statue is not partitioned 
so that one part of it stands on one pillar, and the other part on the second; nor does the 
statue stand on the first pillar, or even on the second; rather, the statue stands as a whole 
on the two pillars.  Without both pillars, the statue would fall; the whole statue would 
fall, not just part of it.  In an alternative setup, the statue could be supported by several 
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 Plato does consider partitioning of attributes in the Parmenides (130e-131e) but rejects it.   
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pillars and not fall by the removal of one or more of them, but only come to be fully 
supported by fewer of them.  Similarly with the many owners of an instance of an 
attribute.  In the case of their being ‘two people’, the loss of one would be detrimental to 
the plural-instantiation of that attribute, but if they are so many as to form ‘a crowd’, the 
loss of one would not undermine the plural-predication of ‘a crowd’.   
For Socrates, qualifications can come to belong to particular things in two ways, the 
way Hippias described, distributively, but also the way Hippias denied, plurally 
(shared):  
‘If they come to belong to both, they do to each also; and if to each, to both – all 
the examples that you [Hippias] gave.  … But the examples I [Socrates] gave 
were not that way.’  (Hipp. Maj. 303a5-10)   
And the Socratic type of plural, non-distributive predication, can occur together with 
individual-predication:   
‘Then they [the fine things] have some thing that itself makes them be fine, that 
common thing [i.e. the Form of Fine] that belongs to both of them in common, 
and to each privately.  Because I don't suppose there's any other way they would 
both and each be fine.’  (Hipp. Maj. 300a9-b2)   
(It is interesting here that Plato seems to be introducing a linguistic criterion for the 
distinction between distributive and plural predication, e.g. not the Hippian ‘they are 
11 
 
fine’, but the Socratic ‘they are jointly fine’.)  The Socratic type of plural-predication 
can alternatively occur without individual-predication of the same attribute: 
[Socratic hypothesis:] ‘Doesn't that attribute [the fine] adhere in both, but not in 
each? … 
Then that's not what makes each of them fine; it doesn't adhere in each. So the 
[Socratic] hypothesis lets us call both of them fine, but it doesn't let us call each 
of them fine.’  (Hipp. Maj. 302e5-303a1)   
In both Socratic cases of plural-predication, the instance of the attribute which qualifies 
jointly the many as f is different from any individual instances of it in each of the many.  
Although it is ‘textually underdetermined’ what the ontology of the cases where 
Socrates agrees with Hippias’ examples is, I have tried to shed light on the ontological 
difference between the two for Socrates, premised on whether the collective attribution 
involves or not a shared attribute.  (Plato’s position could have been more thoroughly 
developed in the text with correlations between linguistic forms and distributive versus 
plural attributions of collective qualification. For instance correlating more explicitly an 
attribution such as ‘they are tall’ with distributive predication, and an attribution such as 
‘they are vivacious’ with plural predication, if they are jointly vivacious.)  The complex 
ontological account presented above is required to explain the intricate semantics of 
plural-predication in language through the Theory of Forms.   
 
Related Individuals in Plato’s Theory of Forms  
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Plato’s Theory of Forms is designed to offer the metaphysics of predication by showing 
what it is for an object to be qualified in any way.  An object is f by partaking in the 
Form of F-ness: 
‘Is there or is there not an absolute justice? Assuredly there is.  
And an absolute beauty and absolute good? Of course.’ (Phaedo 65d4-8)   
‘They agreed that each of the abstract qualities exists and that other things which 
participate in these get their names from them.’ (Phaedo 102a10-b)   
The individuals get their names from them, but also they become like the Form in which 
they partake: 
‘... if there is anything beautiful besides Beauty itself, it is beautiful for no other 
reason than that it shares in that Beauty. ... nothing else makes it beautiful other 
than the presence of, or the sharing in, or however you may describe its 
relationship to that Beauty we mentioned, for I will not insist on the precise 
nature of the relationship, but that all things are made beautiful by Beauty.’ 
(Phaedo 100c4-d8)   
Forms are transcendent entities, which, notoriously, makes partaking in them a 
theoretically challenging problem for the theory.  But this will not be our concern here.  
It is a different aspect of the Forms that is of direct interest in our present inquiry, 
namely, what it is that a Form can offer to an individual that partakes in it, however the 
partaking is achieved.   
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Forms are of a single kind, monoeidic. This means that when an individual partakes of a 
Form F, all that the Form can do for that individual is to qualify it as an f.  Plato is 
explicit in stating that Forms are monoeidic, each standing for a single kind: 
‘Can the Equal itself, the Beautiful itself, each thing in itself, the real, ever be 
affected by any change whatever? Or does each of them that really is, being 
uniform [monoeides] by itself, remain the same and never in any way tolerate any 
change whatever?’ (Phaedo 78d3-7)   
This does not mean that a Form has no further properties.  It means that there is a single 
property that a Form stands for, which is the only property it can endow to its partakers.   
The same is true when plural-subjects partake together in a Form; the partaking endows 
the subjects with a single instance, of a single attribute – the one the Form stands for – 
which belongs jointly to these subjects together.  Thus, an individual or individuals 
partaking in a Form will be qualified with the kind that Form is, namely the single 
property that constitutes the Form, e.g. Justice, Beauty, Goodness, Heat, Smallness etc.  
Joint ownership of an instance of a property is like joint ownership of a book – there is 
only one book but more than one owners of it. 
There are two problems that arise for a theory of related individuals based on the 
ontology of the Theory of Forms.  The first is that qualifying a partaker does not relate 
the partaker to anything; and the second is that each Form can qualify its partaker(s) 
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with a single qualification, while asymmetric relations qualify their relata with different 
qualifications.  
I find the monoeidic (uni-form) character of the Forms to be the determining factor for 
whatever treatment of asymmetrically related objects can be given in Plato’s ontology.  
This is so because the monoeidic nature of the Forms prevents the Forms from standing 
for asymmetric relations.  Asymmetric relations qualify their relata with different 
qualifications.  For instance, the asymmetric teacher-student relation takes individuals as 
relata, and qualifies one with the role of the teacher and the other with the role of their 
student.  There can be no Form in Plato’s Theory of Forms which could do the same for 
the particulars that partook in the Form.  There can be a Form of Teacher, or a Form of 
Student; but no individuals that partook in either Form could be thereby qualified with 
the roles of teacher to student. Furthermore, although some individuals could be 
qualified as students by partaking in the Form of Student, and others as teachers by 
partaking in the Form of Teacher, they would not be thereby related to each other as 
teachers to their students.   
Generally, partaking in Forms qualifies but does not relate partakers; and the monoeidic 
character of Forms results in there being no Form in Plato’s theory which would qualify 
its partakers with different qualifications. This, then, gives rise to the question of how 
Plato could explain the ontology of related individuals, and even more challenging, the 
ontology of asymmetrically related individuals in the Theory of Forms, if he has only 
qualifying (non-relational) monoeidic Forms at his disposal.   
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I will argue that Plato does address the question of the ontology of symmetrically and 
asymmetrically related individuals, and that he resolves this problem, not by introducing 
sui-generis relational Forms, but uniquely, via plural-predication in monadic Forms and 
in forms of Opposites.  Plato designs a special version of plural-partaking in Forms to 
address the problem of symmetrically and asymmetrically related objects.  We shall first 
look at Plato’s description of  asymmetrically related objects, because both ontological 
problems of asymmetry and of relatedness arise with respect to them.   
Plato discusses the ontology of asymmetric relations in his dialogue the Phaedo.  He 
offers examples of comparative relatives. He considers individuals that differ between 
them by being bigger or smaller than one another: 
‘it is through Largeness that large things are large and larger things are larger, 
and … smaller things are made small by Smallness’. (Phaedo 100e5-6)   
According to the Theory of Forms, if an individual is qualified as large, it is so qualified 
on account of its partaking in the Form of Largeness, and correspondingly with small 
individuals partaking in the Form of Smallness.  This is in line with the monoeidic 
character of the Forms.  (We assume that an individual that is larger than another is, by 
that token, also large, at least in that context.)  
Proceeding, Plato examines the relativity of asymmetrically related objects. He begins 
with the following problem:  
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“When you say that Simmias is larger than Socrates and smaller than Phaedo, do 
you not say that there is in Simmias largeness and smallness?” [Phaedo 102b ff.] 
This raises for Plato the problem of how something large can be small, since they are 
antithetical qualifications.  The solution he finds is to identify (for the first time in the 
history of metaphysics) the contingency and so non-intrinsicness of some of the 
properties that qualify an individual:   
‘do you agree that the words of the statement ‘Simmias is larger than Socrates’ 
do not express the truth of the matter? It is not, surely, the nature of Simmias to 
be larger than Socrates because he is Simmias but because of the largeness he 
happens to have? Nor is he larger than Socrates because Socrates is Socrates, but 
because Socrates has smallness compared with [pros] the largeness of the other? 
– True. ‘Nor is he [Simmias] smaller than Phaedo because Phaedo is Phaedo, but 
because Phaedo has largeness compared with the smallness of Simmias? – That is 
so.' (Phaedo 102b8-c9)   
What this explanation introduces is a distinction between what it is to be a particular 
individual, say Simmias, and the qualifications Simmias may happen to have which are 
not aspects of being that individual, of his nature.  It is not in the nature of Simmias to 
be larger than Socrates, but this is only a contingent feature of Simmias.  Plato 
introduces the following criterion for distinguishing between contingent and non-
contingent qualifications: ‘I admit and endure smallness and still remain the same 
person and am this small man’. (Phaedo 102e2-5).  This criterion licenses the 
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counterfactual test for the distinction between an individual’s nature and its contingent 
properties – e.g. If I was qualified as large, I would be the same person I am.  Plato does 
not offer further explanation in the text for us to be able to tell whether he believes that 
the largeness of Simmias is not an aspect of the nature of Simmias (of being a person), 
or whether he believes that largeness is not an aspect of his identity (of being Simmias) – 
there are indications in Plato’s language for both.  These metaphysical distinctions can 
be studied in the more precise treatment of the conceptions of ‘essential nature’ and of 
‘individual’ in Aristotle’s system.   
Plato detects and addresses the relativity of contingent asymmetric qualifications, which 
is due to the circumstantial conditions of the related individuals: 
‘Then Simmias is called small and large, being between the two [Phaedo and 
Socrates], presenting his smallness to be overcome by the largeness of one 
[Phaedo], and his largeness to overcome the shortness of the other [Socrates].
4’ 
(Phaedo 102c10-d2, my emphasis)   
Having established that largeness and smallness are not in the nature of each of the 
compared individuals, Plato turns to the context in which these qualifications emerge.  
Each individual is qualified as large or small, not in itself, but only in comparison to 
                                                          
4
 This also introduces the comparison of the sizes of the individuals.  But Plato does not generalise this into a 
metaphysics of quantity, in the way that Aristotle will, as he is focusing on Forms of Opposites.  Forms of 
Quantities, such as so much weight, or such and such a height would raise problems of their own in the theory of 
Forms, which Plato does not seem willing to introduce.  An indication of this is that he immediately says, after the 
quoted sentence: “And he [Socrates] laughed and said, ‘I seem to be speaking like a legal document, but it really is 
very much as I say’”. The claim of legal fastidiousness is only to indicate that he was already being overly 
meticulous in his ontological description.  Nevertheless, it may be that quantitative qualifications are unavoidable 
in a complete account of the theory.  More generally, Plato does not develop a theory of what occasions or grounds 
partaking in Forms.   
18 
 
another individual.  Thus, Simmias is larger than Socrates and smaller than Phaedo 
because it so happens.  Simmias has largeness, not in himself, as Simmias, but in 
comparison to Socrates’ smallness, and has smallness in comparison to Phaedo’s 
largeness.   
Plato even becomes graphic in his description of the contingency and relativity of the 
comparison in this context:   
‘One of two things must take place: either the largeness in us flees, or withdraws 
when its opposite, smallness, advances toward it, or it is destroyed by the 
opposites’ approach . … either it goes away or is destroyed when that happens.’ 
(Phaedo 102d-103a, my emphasis)   
What is significant for our own purposes in this description is that the partaking in 
Largeness or Smallness is temporary and contextual.  Simmias’ largeness surpasses the 
smallness of Socrates, while his smallness is surpassed by the largeness of Phaedo.  
What Plato is emphasising is that the presence of largeness or smallness in an individual 
is circumstantial, and dictated not by the individual’s nature, but by the context.  The 
contextuality of the relative qualifications is expressed in Plato’s theory, not in a relation 
between Opposite Forms, but in the joint-partaking by the two individuals (which is 
developed in what follows).   
 
Symmetrically related individuals: the Form of Equality 
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I read Plato in the conventional and common sense way of understanding the Form of 
Equality just like all other Forms, as a single transcendent property rather than as two 
equal entities.
5
  What is it, then, for a thing to be equal?  It can only be equal to another 
thing, which, too, is equal to the first.  But how is this to be explained in terms of the 
Theory of Forms?  Plato does not discuss this explicitly, but one can surmise its 
ontology from similar cases that are discussed by him.   
It is the relativity and contextuality of the equality between two individuals which 
invites comparison to Plato’s treatment of similarly relative cases of qualification; 
specifically, that of being two, or of some objects being attractive or harmonious 
together.  We saw above that Plato’s explanation of Socrates and Hippias being two is 
that they both share the qualification of being two, which we explained in the Theory of 
Forms by the plural-partaking of the individuals in in the Form of Two. Further, Plato’s 
explanation of two objects looking beautiful together is that they share the qualification 
of beauty, for which they need to plurally-partake in the Form of Beauty.  We have seen 
that what is particular about such partaking is that the individuals partake together, 
namely, they share a single instance of the Form’s property.  Thus, it is not Socrates that 
is two and Hippias that is two, but only both of them together bear the property of 
twoness.  Similarly, e.g., these objects are, by hypothesis, beautiful together.   
My proposal is that plural-partaking is Plato’s solution to the way related individuals 
partake of Forms; namely, his solution rests on the way that related items partake of 
                                                          
5
 For a criticism of considering the Form of the Equal as a pair of Forms, see Matthen’s discussion of Castaneda 
(1972) .  (Matthen 1984, 308).   
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Forms.  This is more directly evident in the case of symmetric relations.  I take it that 
equal individuals partake in the Form of Equality in the way that two individuals 
partake in the Form of Twoness.  They partake plurally, together, while none of these 
individuals bears the Form’s property on its own, but only jointly with its co-partaking 
partner.  In this way individuals are equal together. 
If I am right, there is an  important and challenging question that arises.  Two equal 
things are equal together.  Is this the same as being equal to one another?  Furthermore, 
is sharing a property an appropriate way of thinking of related individuals?   
Let us consider two individuals which are beautiful together, but not singly.  How does 
this qualification differ in type from two individuals which are equal together?  I suggest 
that they are the same type of qualification, and that this is a different way of conceiving 
of relations than the way in which they have traditionally been understood.  We are 
accustomed to thinking of relations as ‘arches’ between objects.  Could it be that Plato 
did not think of them in this way?  Could it be that he thought of two equal individuals 
as being qualified together as equal? That he thought that the way they relate to each 
other does not connect them, but qualifies them in some way?  Is this how we, too, think 
of individuals when we classify them into equivalence classes – for example, all A-
students?  Are A-students related to one another, or jointly qualified?   
Consider things that are beautiful, and things that are equal, where none of them is 
beautiful or equal on its own.  The beautiful things are beautiful because of how they 
each relate aesthetically to the other; the equal things are equal because of how they 
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each relate quantitatively to the other.  And yet we do not think of being beautiful as a 
relation.  It is possible that this is how Plato thought of related individuals, namely as 
group-qualifications of individuals which together are f, even is none of them is f 
individually.  Consider individuals which are heavy (for the elevator), and individuals 
which are equal.  Their weights, each weight with the other weights, ground the 
individuals’ heaviness in the one case, and their (say) sizes ground their equality, to 
each other, in the second.  The individuals which are heavy are plurally heavy; doesn’t 
this make the equals plurally equal?   
One may remark on the difference between the equals being equal to each other, while 
heavy things being heavy with each other. But the question is not whether they are 
differently related, which is not disputable; rather, it is whether they are qualified with 
categorically different types of qualification (as relational, and non-relational).  Their 
difference seems irrelevant for the categorical classification of the qualification: are two 
harmonious sounds harmonious in relation ‘to’ one another, or are they harmonious 
‘with’ one another?  More generally, we do not think that ‘over’, ‘in’, ‘on the side of’, 
‘with’, etc., signal different ontological categories of the respective qualifications. Why 
should the difference between ‘to’ and ‘with’ signify a categorical difference of the 
respective qualifications? I suggest that it does not, and that Plato did not see, e.g., being 
two (with one another) as a categorically different type of qualification than being equal 
(to one another).   
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The intuition that Plato develops is that we can capture the dependence of related 
individuals, not by connecting them through ‘bridges’ between them, i.e. relations, but 
by their joint partaking which results in their sharing a qualification.  A shared 
qualification introduces the oneness of the qualification which is owned by more 
subjects than one, and which embodies the dependence between the subjects. Their 
dependence results from the requirement that the partaking that will secure such a 
qualification for them all needs to be joint partaking.  Joint partaking represents 
dependence, even in less conspicuously relational plural qualifications such as being 
two, or beautiful (together), or harmonious, or heavy, or equal, etc.   
Asymmetrically related individuals 
I derive the solution for asymmetrically related individuals proposed below from Plato’s 
description of ‘Simmias … being between the two [Phaedo and Socrates], presenting his 
smallness to be overcome by the largeness of one [Phaedo], and his largeness to 
overcome the shortness of the other [Socrates].’ (Phaedo 102c10-d2)  What does it 
mean that the largeness of Simmias overcomes the shortness of Socrates?  How can 
largeness be compared to shortness?  I suggest that Plato sees opposites on the model of 
the hot and the cold – they are comparable because they can compromise each other: 
when one adds hot and cold water together one gets lukewarm water.  This means that 
the difference between the opposites is reduced to a difference of value and strength, 
rather than a difference of quality.  Generalising, the difference between opposites is a 
difference of the quantity in a qualitative common scale between them, which allows for 
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opposites to be compared and to overpower one another.  This presupposed common 
qualitative ground, which reduces the difference between Opposite Forms to quantity, is 
the key to plural-partaking in Opposite Forms; and it sets Opposite Forms apart from 
non-Opposite Forms which differ qualitatively between them.   
The ontology of asymmetrically related individuals is, expectedly, more complex than 
of symmetrically related ones, but I suggest that they are handled by Plato in the same 
way: as joint-qualifications resulting from plural-partaking in Forms.  This is what 
follows from the realisation that opposites are comparable, as explained above: the 
difference of two opposite qualifications in a comparative context is a difference of 
degree, rather than of quality.  It is as if Opposite Forms stand for a common qualitative 
ground that differs quantitatively.  Hence, partaking in Opposite Forms can be plural in 
so far as it qualifies individuals with the same type of qualitative state; and it also needs 
to be partaking in two Forms rather than a single one, because the qualifications of the 
partaking individuals here are quantitatively different (as opposed to qualifications 
resulting from plural-partaking in a single Form, as e.g. with equal individuals partaking 
jointly in the Form of Equality).  Asymmetrically related individuals need to plurally-
partake in more than one Forms.  
Thus if A and B are two objects where A is hotter than B, A and B plurally-partake of 
the Form of the Hot and the Form of the Cold; namely, A partakes of the Form of the 
Hot while B partakes of the Form of the Cold, and they thereby come to share the same 
type of qualitative states – of temperature – only in different strengths each.  Thus 
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plural-partaking in Opposite Forms results in the individuals sharing a common 
qualitative state, but to a different degree each, by acquiring their states from different 
Opposite Forms.   
Importantly, I am not suggesting that plural-partaking in Forms of Opposites is a 
condition for participating in Opposites.  For Plato, an object can participate non-
comparatively in an Opposite Form, e.g. of the Just. Thus, Socrates is just, namely, he 
has a harmonious rational soul, independently of the state of the soul of anyone else.  
But Socrates was also more just than Phaedo. In the first context, the predication of 
being just is not comparative, and Socrates’ partaking in the Form of the Just is 
individual-partaking.  In the latter case, the context is comparative: Socrates is more just 
than Phaedo; the two subjects partake plurally of the Forms of Justice and Injustice.  
This means that they both have harmonious souls, but to different degrees of harmony 
each.  Hence, we see that for Plato, qualifications from the Forms of Opposites can be 
independent of each other in some contexts, and relative to one another for other 
contexts; in the first case, there is individual-partaking in the Opposites, and in the 
relative case plural-partaking. Which of the two kinds of partaking occurs in each case 
is determined contextually, not by a metaphysical bonding between Opposite Forms.   
There is therefore a subtle difference between plural-partaking in the Form of Twoness 
or Beauty or Equality, and plural-partaking in a Pair of Opposite Forms such as the 
Forms of the Large and the Small.  The difference is that Socrates and Hippias share a 
single instance of the Form of Twoness, by partaking jointly in it.  But Simmias and 
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Socrates do not share an instance of a single Form; they share a pair-of-relatively-
determined instances of Opposite Forms in that context; they do so by each individual 
acquiring an instance of a respective Opposite relative to the other.  Is this plural-
partaking?  I wish to claim that it is, and that this is in fact a strength of the Theory of 
Forms.  What the Theory of Forms cannot provide is a Form of Larger, and a Form of 
Smaller.  But it can provide large-small pairs of qualifications. It can provide this, not 
by linking the Forms Large and Small, but by linking the partaking in the Opposite 
Forms, through plural-partaking in them. This is the sense in which the partaking by 
Simmias and Socrates in the Form of Large and the Form of Small respectively is plural. 
A single qualification results from this plural-partaking, namely ‘a large-small 
qualification’ of the plural subjects Simmias and Socrates; the two qualifications of the 
two objects are a shared qualification because of the relativity and interdependence 
between the qualifications, which gives them a kind of oneness.  
But it cannot be full-blown oneness because the asymmetry of the ‘large-small’ 
qualification presents a problem for the nature of the qualification. For full-blown 
oneness, a single property would need to somehow do the work of two properties(?).  
Instead, Plato develops an account where there are two qualifications, resulting from 
two properties – Forms – which are interdependently determined.   
There is an indication that Plato saw the relativity of opposites, when it arises, as 
interdependence; he says in the Parmenides (133c7-e3): ‘those ideas which are what 
they are relative to each other have their nature relative to one another … . … mastery 
26 
 
itself is what it is of slavery itself, and likewise slavery itself is slavery to mastery itself’ 
(my emphasis). Aristotle captured the interdependence of relatives in terms of 
counterfactual dependencies on each other, e.g. between a master and a slave, or, as 
above, between greater and smaller. In this way one could appreciate that partaking in 
relatives was in a sense partaking in a single condition of interdependence.  Aristotle 
handled it through ontological dependence between monadic properties, while Plato 
through plural-partaking in monadic Forms – Opposites. It is in this sense that plural-
partaking in different Forms by different individuals is ‘plural-partaking: in the sense 
that the acquired qualifications by the individuals are capturing an instance of an 
interdependence condition in that context.   
 
Conclusion 
Much of the subtlety of the Theory of Forms is lost if we do not recognise that Plato 
distinguished between two different types of partaking in the Forms: single-partaking, 
and plural-partaking. Plural-partaking captures the relativity of the resulting 
qualification(s) through the joint metaphysical function of partaking occasioned in that 
context.  But individual-partaking in the same Form(s) is not relativised to context.  
Symmetrically related individuals partake plurally in the same Form, while 
asymmetrically related individuals partake plurally in pairs of Opposite Forms.  We can 
thus understand the following qualifications as ontologically of the same kind, i.e. 
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plural, in Plato’s system: being harmonious, being suitable, equal, being a spouse, a 
teacher, being the leader, being hotter, etc.   
It is the nature of plural-partaking that reflects the relativity of the qualifications of the 
partaking individuals, such as Hippias and Socrates in being two or Simmias being 
larger than Socrates, rather than a connection between the Forms (as per Castaneda 
1972).  Their contextual interdependence in partaking jointly in a Form binds them 
under their shared resulting qualification, whether that is being two, or being larger and 
smaller.  There is no further interconnection between the individuals than their plural-
partaking in the Forms.  
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Appendix on Castaneda’s reading 
Plato’s theory of related individuals has not attracted much discussion in the exegetical 
tradition. More recently, there was a focused discussion of Castaneda’s reading of Plato 
on relations (Castaneda 1972, and 1978), which triggered responses and criticisms by 
Gallop (1976), McPherran (1983),  and Matthen (1984).  Castaneda’s reading is 
fundamentally different from the present one, in so far as he premises it on a position 
that is antithetical to my position here, but also, a position I have argued is not Platonic.  
Castaneda’s theory is based on the claim that: ‘All Forms are monadic, i.e., each Form is 
instantiated only by one particular in each fact it is involved in: no Form is ever 
instantiated by pairs or other n-tuples, whether ordered or not.’ (Castaneda 1972, 471). 
This is a flat denial of the possibility of plural-partaking in a Form, which I have shown 
to be contradicted by Plato’s account of plural-subjects.   
One apparent similarity between Castaneda’s interpretation and the present one is that 
he holds that related individuals partake of chained-Forms, e.g. Hot-Cold.  But for 
Castaneda, nothing can partake of the Cold alone. Rather it must do so while something 
else partakes of the Hot. This has several ontological consequences for the Forms, which 
Matthen (1984) has itemised in his criticisms of Canstaneda’s account. But the starkest 
problem I find in Castaneda’s reading is that he avoids positing relations between things 
in the world only at the cost of introducing relations at the level of the Forms – relations 
which chain some Forms together, and which are not explained by the Theory of Forms.  
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Apart from the explanatory gap this generates, it is also antithetical to Castaneda’s claim 
that Platonic Forms are monadic. Castaneda says:  
‘Plato (as does my [Castaneda’s] general theory) reduces relations to special sets 
of monadic Forms, but does not reduce relational facts to non-relational facts. … 
Thus, it can be said that Plato (as well as my general theory) assimilates relations 
to monadic properties or qualities - in making them all monadic - even though he 
distinguishes (as I do) between the non-relational monadic properties, which can 
be participated in by particulars in isolation, and the relational ones, which 
cannot be participated in except in company, with respect to the partakings of 
other Forms.’  (Castaneda 1978, 41, my emphasis)   
 It is clear that Castaneda requires second level relations in the realm of the Forms, in 
order to explain the nature of the bonding between Opposite Forms. Such relations 
would function as meta-Forms, whose partakers would be first level Opposite Forms.  
But such relational meta-Forms would fully undermine the Platonic programme of 
rendering relations as monadic properties through the Theory of Forms. Not positing 
such relational meta-Forms would leave Castaneda’s account with no explanation for 
the relational bonding of Opposite Forms, which is a fundamental gap, in view of the 
overall aim of Plato’s ontology of monadic Forms, which Castaneda recognises.  
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